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The President's Daily Brief

23 October 1971

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THE PRESIDENT'S DAILY BRIEF

23 October 1971

PRINCIPAL DEVELOPMENTS

Indian saber-rattling is continuing, apparently still with the hope of pushing Islamabad toward a settlement with the East Pakistanis. *(Page 1)*

The abrupt return of the Chinese chargé d'affaires in New Delhi to Peking has touched off speculation about a possible warming of Sino-Indian diplomatic relations. *(Page 2)*

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The more moderate fedayeen leaders may be moving toward the view that they settle with Jordan on King Husayn's terms. *(Page 5)*

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INDIA-PAKISTAN

In the last several days a number of high-ranking Indian officials have clearly stated that India will not withdraw troops from border areas until Pakistan gives some indication of moving toward a settlement with the Bengalis that will permit a return of the refugees. New Delhi has not accepted the US-originated proposal for a mutual troop withdrawal from the border, claiming that such a move is logistically simple for Pakistan but difficult for India, which normally bases some of its key units hundreds of miles from the border.

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Lack of progress in finding a solution to the crisis is causing Indian officials increasingly to view war as almost inevitable, but New Delhi may still have hopes that saber-rattling will force Islamabad to seek a political settlement with the East Pakistanis. The Indians may also be waiting for the insurgency in East Pakistan to gain momentum. Daylight sabotage in Dacca this week is a new development and may be a harbinger of the anticipated fall offensive.

In a conversation on Thursday with Ambassador Farland, the civilian director of Pakistan's Intelligence Bureau, N. A. Razvi, said he had changed his view of the likelihood of an outbreak of hostilities. Two weeks ago, he said, he believed there was a 50-50 chance; now he believes there is a 60-percent chance that "India's provocations" will bring about a war with Pakistan. Razvi observed that while it was not in Pakistan's interest to engage in war with India, the Pakistanis would fight "to a man" to defend their homeland.

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COMMUNIST CHINA - INDIA

The Chinese chargé d'affaires in New Delhi has returned to Peking abruptly. His trip has touched off a new set of rumors [redacted] 50X1 that Sino-Indian relations are 50X1 about to be raised to the ambassadorial level for the first time since the early 1960s.

The Indians have dropped several hints during the past few months that they wish to improve relations with China. They no doubt hope that an improvement in relations will reduce Pakistani intransigence over East Pakistan. [redacted] 50X1

The Chinese have so far maintained a "correct" and largely hands-off attitude toward events on the subcontinent, avoiding public actions or statements that might exacerbate the situation. They have been careful to keep the door open to India. Subtle signs that the Chinese were not averse to an improvement of relations with New Delhi were apparent well before the East Pakistani crisis erupted, and they have not been absent in recent months. China has invited an Indian ping-pong team to Peking next month, and the Chinese have maintained public silence on the Indo-Soviet treaty signed last August, [redacted] 50X1 50X1

China would weigh carefully the political returns from improved relations with India against the likelihood of Pakistani resentment and the danger that a gesture toward

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India would be interpreted in New Delhi as a "green light" for military measures against Pakistan. Nevertheless, Peking's handling of the crisis on the subcontinent thus far suggests that it may well be receptive to Indian overtures, if they are made. The Chinese may calculate that better relations with New Delhi will help them neutralize Soviet influence in India while enabling Peking to counsel restraint both to the Indians and to the Pakistanis.

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INTERNATIONAL MONETARY DEVELOPMENTS

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NOTES

Jordan-Fedayeen: Except for the most radical groups, the fedayeen seem to be moving toward a consensus that they must accept King Husayn's terms if they are to survive as a movement. Pressed in varying degrees by Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Lebanon to take such a position, they may be on their way to being convinced that they must accept a bad bargain now if they are ever to rebuild a state-within-a-state in Jordan. We believe Fatah leader Yasir Arafat is telling the Soviets something along these lines during his current visit to Moscow. We also believe he is asking for direct shipments of arms for the reunified fedayeen movement that he is predicting will emerge. The Soviets are unlikely to change their policy of providing arms to the fedayeen only through the radical Arab governments.

Cuba-Chile: [redacted] 50X1

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France [redacted] 50X1

. A reassessment of French political, economic, and cultural interests in both North and South Vietnam is now under way. Pompidou does not seem to have abandoned the long-time Gaullist aim of trying to play a significant role in an Indochinese settlement and thus undoubtedly sees a certain value in cultivating relations with both sides. France has made no moves on the Vietnamese question since its call in April 1970 for a reconvening of the Geneva conference.

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